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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between state and federal power has puzzled
jurists since the nation began.' During the last twenty years alone,
the Supreme Court has fashioned three different-and discor-
dant-faces for federalism. After two decades of turmoil, it is time to
assess the Court's three models of federalism and to determine
whether any of them provides an appropriate principle to guide future
federal-state relations. As I will argue below, the Court's first two
models of federalism are outdated or incompatible with political real-
ity. The third model, however, holds some promise for adjudicating
the future bounds of state and federal power.
* Professor of Law and Women's Studies, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
University of Illinois College of Law. B.A. 1977, Harvard College; J.D. 1980, Columbia
University. I thank my research assistant, Christine Schmidt, for her excellent assistance in
preparing this Article.
1. See, for example, New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (observing
that a dispute over the bounds of state and federal sovereignty "implicates ... perhaps our
oldest question of constitutional law"); id. at 2420 (citing many of the Court's conflicting prece-
dents in this area).
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II. THE SEARCH FOR A COHERENT THEORY OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS: THREE MODELS OF FEDERALISM
A. The Territorial Model
The first, and oldest, of the Supreme Court's concepts of feder-
alism is the territorial model. This model recognizes that there is a
discernible boundary between the subjects fit for national regulation
and those reserved for state governance. Territorialists argue that
the national government is supreme in some areas, while states reign
sovereign in others. Adherents of this model, for example, might
declare that the national government directs foreign affairs while the
states control domestic relations.2
Under the territorial model, federalism violations occur when
the national government attempts to invade a substantive area of law
reserved to the states. The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery3 drew heavily on this model, espe-
cially as the decision was interpreted by lower courts and commenta-
tors. In Usery, the Court held that Congress could not regulate the
wages and hours of state and local employees working in areas of
"traditional governmental functions."4 This emphasis on traditional
functions evoked a territorial concept. State employees working in
"traditional" spheres (such as "fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation")5 were subject to
state regulation while workers in other "nontraditional"
fields-such as railroad operation-submitted to national legislation.6
2. For a classic articulation of the territorial model, see Herbert Storing's description of
federalism in Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1 The Complete Anti-Federalist 24, 32 (U. of Chicago, 1981)
(stating. "Within its sphere the general government is a complete national government, but
that sphere is limited; and within their own spheres the states act as constitutionally independ-
ent entities"). H. Jefferson Powell persuasively argues that this model most closely captures the
Framers' understanding of the federal system, which was aided by the Framers' assumption
that the national government's power was sufficiently limited to leave clearly demarcated
spheres of authority for the states. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633, 655-57 (1993).
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
4. Id. at 852.
5. Id. at 851. The Court provided this partial list of "line and support activities which are
well within the area of traditional operations of state and local governments." Id. at 851 n.16.
6. In distinguishing several earlier cases, Usery observed that operation of an interstate
railroad "was not... an area that the States have regarded*as integral parts of their govern-
mental activities." Id. at 854 n.18. Six years later, the Court confirmed this result, allowing
1564 [Vol. 47:1563
1994] THREE FACES OF FEDERALISM 1565
By dividing government functions into state-regulated zones and
nationally dominated spheres, Usery endorsed a territorial approach
and spawned a decade of lawsuits attempting to distinguish
"traditional governmental functions" from nontraditional ones.7
The territorial model of federalism is problematic because it
conflicts with modern concepts of Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, and other constitutional provi-
sions. The Supreme Court has interpreted congressional power so
broadly under those clauses that virtually no substantive area of law
is now beyond the national government's reach.8 Education, domestic
relations, local transit, health care-all of these areas affect interstate
commerce in our modern economy or receive sizable subsidies of
federal tax money.
In order to preserve a territorial vision of federalism, therefore,
it is necessary to interpret the Tenth Amendment (or some other
constitutional provision) as an affirmative limit on congressional
Congress to regulate the employees of a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
7. On remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Usery, the district court held that
the High Court's decision did not shelter all state and local employees from the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Instead, the Department of Labor and courts had to make case-by-
case determinations of whether particular employees worked within "integral operations of the
States [or] their political subdivisions in areas of traditional governmental functions." National
League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703, 706 (D.D.C. 1977), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Other courts followed the same lead. See,
for example, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating "the
Supreme Court confined the parameters of [its] sovereignty limitation to those public services or
activities which involve traditional or integral governmental functions.... The meaning of this
limitation is the controlling question in the present case"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism Redu=" Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60
Wash. U. L. Q. 779, 808-10 n.115, 896-97 n.454 (1982) (citing cases adjudicating the distinction
between traditional and nontraditional governmental functions). The emphasis in these cases
heightened the impression (consistent with a territorial model) that Usery reserved dominance
to the states in some areas while ceding power to the national government in others.
Scholarly commentary similarly focused on the Court's distinction between traditional and
nontraditional governmental functions. See generally Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and
States'Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L. J.
1165 (1977); Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1977). Once
again, this perspective enhanced the territorial image of National League of Cities.
8. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418-19 (1992) (describing growth of
congressional power under the Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and Proper clauses);
Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and
Procedure § 4.8 at 394 (West, 2d ed. 1992). But see notes 73-77 and accompanying text
(discussing recent cases in which lower courts have breathed life into the territorial model by
refusing to find congressional power over certain private activities).
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power under the Commerce and Spending clauses. The Tenth
Amendment must serve as a shield, protecting areas of governance
(such as the wages of fire fighters) that otherwise would fall within
the Commerce or Spending powers. This is what the Supreme Court
attempted to do when it revived the Tenth Amendment in Usery.9
As the Court ultimately discovered, however, the Tenth
Amendment simply is not adequate to that task. The amendment's
language is too weak to constitute an impenetrable barrier against
national regulation. Instead, the Tenth Amendment seems merely to
state a truism, that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people."1 Neither the language of
the Tenth Amendment nor political theory, moreover, have succeeded
in defining a unique circle of "traditional governmental functions"
reserved to the states." Without a ready principle to distinguish
national fields of regulatory authority from state areas of responsibil-
ity, the territorial model of federalism has failed to retain favor.
B. The Federal Process Model
Frustrated with the shortcomings of territorial federalism, the
Supreme Court abandoned territorialism in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority12 and adopted its second model, the
"federal process" theory of federalism. This theory derives from the
work of Herbert Wechsler, Jesse Choper, and others. 3 According to
this model, the Constitution's Framers protected the integrity of state
governments through the structure of the national government rather
than through judicially enforceable limits on the scope of national
regulatory power. In particular, advocates of this model maintain
that the U.S. Senate protects state interests by guaranteeing equal
9. "Appellants in no way challenge these decisions establishing the breadth of authority
granted Congress under the commerce power. Their contention, on the contrary, is that...
Congress... [has] transgress[ed] an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power.....
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 841.
10. U.S. Const., Amend. X. The Court first dubbed the Tenth Amendment a "truism" in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). See also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417-19.
11. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39, 546-47.
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13. See generally Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 171-
259 (U. of Chicago, 1980); La Pierre, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (cited in note 7); Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954). See also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.11
(citing the works of these scholars).
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representation to each state.'4 Because the federal legislative process
adequately protects state interests, federal process theorists conclude
that the states need no further protection from the courts.
In the 1985 Garcia decision, the Supreme Court enthusiasti-
cally embraced this federal process model. The Court declared: "[W]e
are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as
States' is one of process rather than one of result.' 15 In the years fol-
lowing Garcia, lower courts routinely rejected Tenth Amendment
challenges to national legislation by holding that state and local in-
terests demanded no judicial protection because they were shielded
adequately by the national political process. 6
Under some circumstances, the federal process model accu-
rately describes the political relationship between state and national
governments. State governments have powerful lobbying groups to
assert their interests, and national representatives frequently heed
those voices. The history of national legislation demonstrates that the
states frequently influence the legislative process and that they have
achieved exemption from many important national laws. 17
The cases that come to court, however, are the ones in which
state governments have failed to achieve their ends.18 The question is
whether the structure of the national government is sufficiently sensi-
14. See, for example, Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555. The Court listed three other structural
guarantees that it believed would protect state interests: (1) the fact that state legislatures
originally chose United States senators; (2) the fact that states control electoral qualifications
for the House of Representatives; and (3) the fact that state legislatures prescribe the manner of
choosing electors for the President and Vice President. Id. The Seventeenth Amendment
overturned the first of these guarantees in 1913. See note 19 and accompanying text. State
legislatures today also refrain from controlling the selection of presidential or vice presidential
electors; citizens vote for those electors directly. This procedure, however, is a matter of state
law; the Constitution would permit state legislatures to appoint electors themselves. See
Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 9.12 at 704-05 (cited in note 8).
15. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
16. See, for example, Oklahoma ex rel. Comm'rs of the Land Office v. Crook, 966 F.2d 539
(10th Cir. 1992); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Vermont,
904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
17. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-54; Choper, Judicial Review at 185-88 (cited in note 13).
18. For examples of legislation in which the political process failed to protect state inter-
ests, see Mark V. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 74
(Harvard U., 1988) (citing the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, in which
Congress imposed significant costs on local school systems); Tom Diemer, States Take Dim View
of D.C.'s Bright Ideas, Cleveland Plain Dealer 4A (Feb. 6, 1994) (citing a variety of unfunded
federal mandates to states); Senator Judd Gregg, Testimony before Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs (Nov. 3, 1993) (citing examples of legislation burdening states and noting
that the Senate has not been performing its "historic job" of protecting states).
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tive to state interests to leave the important task of policing federal-
state relations entirely to Congress, the President, and the adminis-
trative agencies.
When measured against this yardstick, the federal process
model suffers from several fatal flaws. The most fundamental of
these flaws is the model's very assumption that the political process
contains safeguards that systematically protect the interests of state
governments. The composition of the Senate does not protect the
institutional interests of state governments; instead it protects the
private interests of citizens from less populous states. Farmers from
North Dakota have the same voice in the Senate as apartment dwell-
ers from New York; each group has a chance to advance their con-
cerns on the national agenda.
Nothing in the structure of the Senate, however, insures a
voice for state governments from either New York or North Dakota.
The selection of senators by state legislatures might have had that
effect, but the Seventeenth Amendment repealed that mechanism
more than eighty years ago.19 Today, individual senators may care
about the autonomy of state government, but they are just as likely to
care about the environment, welfare reform, health care, mass tran-
sit, or farm subsidies. Many senators have no experience in state
government, and their reliance on state political machines for reelec-
tion is declining.20 Under these circumstances, there is no formal or
informal structural guarantee that senators (or anybody else) will
represent the interests of state governments in Washington. 1
More important, even if senators and other national officials
maintain some loyalty to the institutional interests of state govern-
ments, that commitment is only one of several competing interests in
19. The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of senators, took effect
in 1913.
20. See Frank Codispoti, The Governorship-Senate Connection: A Step in the Structure of
Opportunities Grows Weaker, Publius 41 (Spring 1987); A. E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the
Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 Ga. L. Rev.
789, 793 (1985); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 847, 862-65 (1979); High Court Ruling Source of Dismay to Local Officials, N.Y.
Times Al (Feb. 21, 1985) (reporting preliminary findings of a study conducted by the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that suggest "Congress ha[s] become an assembly
of independent operators little influenced by party officials or elected officials in (their]
respective states").
21. For further criticism of the federal process model's theory that features of the national
political process protect state interests, see Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue at 73-75 (cited in
note 18); Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 139,
183-85 (1977).
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the national political process. Politics is a process of compromise, in
which one interest rarely triumphs absolutely over all others. If state
autonomy is an important component of our government-one that
should be preserved whatever the countervailing pressures-then we
cannot trust that principle solely to the political process.
There are some circumstances, in fact, in which the interests of
congressional representatives clearly conflict with the institutional
needs of state governments. When pressed to accomplish national
goals without raising taxes, members of Congress have an incentive to
force state governments to administer national programs at state
expense. By following this technique, congressional representatives
can reap credit for the popular benefits of national programs while
making state governments bear the anger generated by the increased
local taxes needed to pay for federally mandated programs.22
The recently enacted "motor voter" bill may be an example of
this slippage between reaping the benefits and paying the costs of
social legislation.23 Congress and President Clinton will reap any
electoral benefits associated with passing this bill.24 Easing voter
22. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2424; Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d
339, 354 (5th Cir.) (observing that when Congress compels the states to implement federal law,
Congress "evades responsibility for the resulting regulation and thereby circumvents the
political check on infringements of state sovereignty" and that under these circumstances "it is
inappropriate for the courts simply to rely on the political process"); Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17
(1988); Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court
Dialogue, 42 Duke L. J. 979, 1018-19 (1993); Diemer, Cleveland Plain Dealer at 4A (cited in note
18).
23. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993),
codified at 42 U.S.C-. § 1973gg et seq. (1994).
24. Clinton administration officials repeatedly cite the motor voter bill as one of the
accomplishments of their administration. See, for example, Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Health
Care to the League of Women Voters (June 14, 1994) (available on LEXIS, NEWS library,
FEDNEW file); Michael Murphy and Chris Fiscus, Gore: 'Things Have Changed for the Good,"
Phoenix Gazette B1 (Apr. 8, 1994) (reporting a speech by Vice President Albert Gore); Susan
Page, Clinton: Let's Get Moving!, Newsday 6 (Jan. 26, 1994) (summarizing Clinton's State of the
Union address). Other representatives similarly touted their support of motor voter legislation
to constituents, and commentators have lauded these national politicians for their role in
enacting the bill. See, for example, Mike Brown, News, Courier-Journal 7A (Nov. 27, 1993)
(reporting that Senator Wendell Ford included his support for motor voter legislation on a list of
personal accomplishments); Jordan Moss, Nice Drive to the Ballot Box, N.Y. Times A23 (May 10,
1994) (applauding Clinton's approval of the motor voter bill as "the final achievement of the
1960s' voting rights revolution" and noting that "Mr. Clinton... rightly invokes the bill as one
of his important achievements in office"); Owen Bieber, Labor Day Message (Sept. 3, 1993)
(available on LEXIS, NEWS library, PRNEWS file) (reporting that the president of the United
Auto Workers publicly praised Clinton and his national supporters for enacting the motor voter
bill).
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registration by allowing adults to register to vote when they obtain
their automobile licenses is an attractive idea. Congress, however,
directed the states to accomplish this end without allocating any
money to support the new initiative.25 In assessing the value of this
legislation, therefore, Congress was able to measure the benefits
without paying much attention to the costs; someone else was going to
pay those costs.
Estimates of the costs imposed by motor voter legislation vary
widely.26 Even the highest estimated costs may be justified if the
program achieves widespread voter registration. The point is not that
motor voter registration is a bad idea-it may prove to be an excellent
idea. The point is that the legislative body adopting this legislation
had no incentive to probe the costs of ihe bill because someone else
was going to pay the tab. That is not responsible lawmaking.
For these and other reasons, the federal process theory fails to
protect adequately the health of state governments within the federal
system.27 In 1992, the Supreme Court appeared to recognize these
flaws, to abandon the federal process theory, and to embrace its third
model of federalism.
C. The Autonomy Model
This third, most recent, model of federalism is the state auton-
omy model that debuted in New York v. United States. 8 Once again,
the model rests on the work of several commentators, including my
own work on the Guarantee Clause. 9 According to autonomy theo-
25. See Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, National Voter Registration Act
of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1993) (minority views).
26. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that motor voter would cost the states
approximately $20 million a year during the statute's first five years. Id. at 41 (CBO cost
estimate). Computerization would entail additional costs, although the states would also reap
some savings under the bill. Id. Several states submitted considerably higher cost estimates to
Congress, and states beginning to implement the bill have complained of higher costs. See id. at
51 (minority statement); Ben Smith, Legislature '94: House and Senate Pick Up the Pace,
Atlanta Constitution E13 (Feb. 20, 1994) (reporting that the implementation of motor voter in
Georgia will cost $6 million).
27. For a more extensive critique of Garcia's process theory, see Merritt, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. at 15-22 (cited in note 22).
28. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
29. See generally Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425
(1987); Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 22). Since New York v. United States, at least
two other scholars have registered support for the autonomy model, although with some
caveats. See Powell, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 689 (cited in note 2) (describing the autonomy model
articulated in New York v. United States as "promising," although lacking a "fully persuasive
1570 [Vol. 47:1563
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rists, courts should intervene in the political process to protect the
independence of state governments, but only when the federal gov-
ernment has tampered with the independent relationship between a
state government and its voters. That sort of interference occurs
when the federal government dictates the structure of state govern-
ments, commandeers the energy of state administrators, or forces
state enactment of particular laws-all without offering state gov-
ernments the option of nonparticipation.3O
When the federal government acts in this manner, it does more
than simply exercise its power under the Supremacy Clause to regu-
late a particular field of private conduct and preempt contrary state
laws. Instead, these actions destroy the essential autonomy of state
governments by forcing those governments to respond to the com-
mands of Congress rather than to the dictates of their voters.
It is important to recognize that the autonomy model of feder-
alism does not guarantee state governments the power to regulate
private behavior in any particular area. Autonomy theorists recog-
nize the power of Congress to preempt virtually any field under the
Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions.3 1 State gov-
ernments, under this theory, are sovereigns who rule over a domain
that is not only limited, but forever shifting. If Congress chooses to
preempt a regulatory field, the states have no choice but to acquiesce.
Congress can always narrow the orbit of state power, but it must
leave the states free to govern autonomously in whatever areas are
left to them.
Autonomy theorists also recognize that state governments
cooperate in a wide variety of federal programs and are heavily de-
pendent upon tax dollars.32 As long as states retain the right to say
"no" to the federal government, they remain responsible to their vot-
ers and preserve their ability to negotiate with the federal govern-
ment over the terms of federal-state programs. The key distinction
for autonomy theorists is between state governments that answer
justification"). See generally Saikrishna Banalove Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1957 (1993) (endorsing the conclusion in New York that the national government may not
commandeer state legislatures, but arguing that Congress should be able to direct state
executive officers to administer federal law).
30. For further discussion of these mechanisms, see Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 40-50,
60-70.
31. See, for example, New York u. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2418-19; Merritt, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. at 58-59.
32. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419, 2423-24; Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 46-50.
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ultimately to their voters, although they may choose to participate in
federal initiatives, and state governments that have become field
offices of the national government, directly compelled to administer
federal programs.
33
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court endorsed the
autonomy model of federalism, while dealing fatal blows to both the
territorial and federal process models.m The Court struck down one
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985,35 not because Congress had invaded a substantive field re-
served to the states, but because Congress had attempted to
"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. '
36
33. The Supreme Court has repeatedly used phrases like "field office" to condemn forbid-
den types of federal regulation. See, for example, New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434 (declaring that
states are not "mere political subdivisions," "regional offices," or "administrative agencies of the
Federal Government"). See generally Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (cited in note 29) (discussing
"field office federalism").
34. In implicitly rejecting the territorial model, the Court noted that "[als the Federal
Government's willingness to exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has grown,
the authority of the States has correspondingly diminished," New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419, so
that Congress today may govern private conduct even in "areas of intimate concern to the
States." Id. at 2421.
Likewise, the Court refused to follow Garcia's process model. Id. Indeed, the result in New
York constitutes a surprisingly strong departure from Garcia. State governments and officials
actually participated in-and supported-enactment of the federal law challenged in New York.
In fact, the law emerged from an extensive dialogue among federal regulators and state officials.
Id. at 2431; id. at 2435-38 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If the federal
process theory ever could block a state challenge to a congressional enactment, New York
seemed to be just that case.
The Court, however, brushed aside these arguments, noting that "[tihe Constitution does
not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit [simply] of the States or state governments
as abstract political entities." Id. at 2431. Instead, "the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals." Id. Federalism is essential to
diffuse political power and to check "the accumulation of excessive power" at the national level.
Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). Thus, state officials could not ratify
an unconstitutional intrusion into state sovereignty, even if they did so knowingly and
purposely.
The Court's rejection of the federal process theory in New York, of course, does not foreclose
reliance on the theory in certain types of cases. The Court might find that, for some types of
cases, the federal process theory provides a convenient presumption of constitutionality. See id.
at 2420 (suggesting that different rules might govern cases in which "Congress has subjected a
State to the same legislation applicable to private parties"). New York makes clear, however,
that such a presumption must always be open to question-a fundamental departure from
Garcia, in which the Court indicated that it would rely upon process except in the rare case in
which a litigant could show "possible failings in the national political process." Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 554.
35. Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq. (Supp. 1994).
36. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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Even when the Constitution empowers Congress "to pass laws requir-
ing or prohibiting certain acts" by private citizens, the Court held,
Congress 'lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts."7 Throughout the New York opinion, the Court
declared its concern with protecting the autonomous processes of
state government and the political accountability of both state and
federal governments. s These concerns are central to the autonomy
modeLs9
III. ASSESSING THE AUTONOMY MODEL
What are we to make of the Court's latest attempt to reconcile
national power and state sovereignty? Does the autonomy model of
federalism serve important values? Is the model consistent with
contemporary needs for a strong central government? And, even if
the autonomy model is politically sound, does it derive any support
from the constitutional text? I will briefly address these questions
below.
A Value of the Autonomy Model
To assess the value of the autonomy model, it is necessary to
ask first whether state governments confer any benefits on our soci-
ety. Should we attempt to protect the vitality of these governments,
or should we allow Congress to whittle them away?
I see at least four values in the continued existence of autono-
mous state governments. First, independent state governments check
the power of the federal government. As long as they remain
autonomous, states can muster considerable lobbying and litigation
37. Id. at 2423.
38. See id. at 2420-21, 2424.
39. New York, of course, was not the first intimation of an autonomy model in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In fact, the Court's opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery contained numerous phrases redolent of the autonomy model. In particular, the Court's
references to the "attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government," 426 U.S. 833,
845 (1976), and its condemnation of national attempts to regulate the "States as States" evoked
an autonomy concept. Id. at 842, 845. These reverberations, however, were overshadowed by
the Court's territorial reference to "traditional governmental finctions," a phrase that
dominated judicial decision making under National League of Cities. Id. at 852.
More definite intimations of the autonomy model appeared in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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forces to challenge national regulation."° With the power to reject
participation in national programs, state governments can also nego-
tiate with national representatives to affect the content of those pro-
grams. And state governments serve as political breeding grounds,
where parties and factions excluded from national power rebuild their
strength and new political forces gain footholds.41 Without these
checks, our powerful national government could become overbearing.42
Second, state governments help diversify participants in the
political process. These governments seem more adept than the na-
tional government at drawing in new political faces. Almost every
political minority in the United States-from Irish Americans at the
beginning of this century to women today-has gained experience in
state or local politics before climbing into national prominence.
43
Third, despite the homogenizing force of McDonald's and other
chain enterprises from coast to coast, state governments continue to
provide choices in living conditions. Some states are friendly to the
environment, while others are more friendly to business. The amount
of money expended on education, welfare, and health care varies
widely from state to state.44 For a nation composed of diverse racial,
cultural, and religious groups, this opportunity to express multiple
social values is essential.45
40. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 5-6 (cited in note 22).
41. See id. at 7.
42. For further discussion of the ways in which state and local governments check the
national government, see Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1500-03 (cited in note 29); Merritt, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. at 4-7; Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in Mark V.
Tushnet, ed., Comparative Constitutional Federalism: Europe and America 77, 103 (Greenwood,
1990); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380-95.
43. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 7-8; Laura Mecoy, State Offers Highest Hopes for
Year of the Woman, Part II, Sacramento Bee Al (July 9, 1993) (noting that women comprise only
6% of the United States Senate and 11% of the House of Representatives, but 20% of all state
legislators); Daniel B. Wood, National Women's Caucus Gathers to Find Strength for Election
Challenges, Christian Science Monitor 1 (July 12, 1993) (reporting that the president of the
National Women's Political Caucus traced the growth of women in politics from success in local
elections during the mid-seventies through wins in state legislatures during the mid-eighties to
bids for governorships and federal offices during the nineties). For a related point, see Powell,
79 Va. L. Rev. at 685-87 (cited in note 2) (suggesting that state governments preserve
opportunities for participatory democracy, which are necessary both to preserve democratic
government and to reduce feelings of alienation in a large nation-state).
44. New Jersey, for example, spends $10,219 annually per pupil for elementary and
secondary education, while Utah spends only $3,092. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993 at 164 (113th ed. 1993).
45. See also Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue at 9 & n.24 (cited in note 18); Howard, 19 Ga.
L. Rev. at 795 (cited in note 20); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 854 (cited in note 20); Richard B.
Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 917, 918 (1985).
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Finally, states offer the laboratories for social experimentation
immortalized by Justice Brandeis's quotable words.46 Those words
proved so quotable that they have become a clich6; yet they retain
substantial truth. Unemployment compensation, anti-discrimination
laws, no-fault compensation schemes, and other social programs
emerged from state experiments.47 Echoes of Brandeis' statement can
be heard today as state initiatives in health care policy and welfare
reform influence national debates over those issues.48
The autonomy model of federalism is useful because it recog-
nizes just these values in state governments. State governments
forced to implement federal commands are unlikely to check the
power of their commanding officer. Nor are such governments likely
to give political newcomers the training they need to succeed in na-
tional politics. Middle managers who lack autonomy to govern their
own domains never have been known for promoting diverse living
conditions or social experiments. In management theory, autonomy
means innovation and diversity, while central control is synonymous
with sameness and rigidity.49 To promote the four values of federal-
ism, states must retain some measure of autonomy.
Some commentators have argued that state autonomy is not necessary to produce this
diversity, because a strong central government could achieve the same result by delegating
power to branch offices or consciously cultivating diverse provinces. See, for example, Arthur
W. MacMahon, The Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Arthur W. MacMahon, ed.,
Federalism; Mature and Emergent 3, 11 (Russell & Russell, 1962). The incentives for uniform-
ity in any centralized organization, however, are powerful and may overwhelm any desire for
diversity. The attempt to create diversity from above, moreover, may foster superficial but
sterile differences-a Disney World of provinces in which the facades differ but the underlying
values are identical.
46. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that each of the states "serve[s] as a laboratory" that may "try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
47. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 22). See also FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Charles
Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 1, 2-3 (1982); Henry J.
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 Yale L. J. 1019, 1034 (1977); Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at
854-55 (cited in note 20).
48. See, for example, Janice Somers, States Pave Way on Managed Competition, Am. Med.
News 1 (Mar. 15, 1993) (describing state innovations that are leading the way in health care
reform); James P. Gannon, Washington: Get Out of Way While States Reform Welfare, Gannett
News Service (Feb. 3, 1994) (available in LEXIS, NEWS library, GNS file) (noting state contri-
butions to welfare reform and stressing the importance of those contributions).
49. See, for example, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search of
Excellence 200-34 (Warner, 1982).
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B. The Price of Freedom
The autonomy model promotes important values, but does it
also exact unacceptable costs? In particular, will the autonomy model
prevent the federal government from acting decisively in areas de-
manding national attention? For at least four reasons, the autonomy
model does not impose undue costs on the national government; in-
stead, the model leaves the central government ample power to regu-
late private behavior.
First, as mentioned above, the autonomy model does not pre-
vent Congress from preempting virtually any area of state law.50 The
model attempts to preserve the control of state voters over their
governments, rather than the control of state governments over par-
ticular substantive areas. Congress, therefore, is free to address any
problems of national scope by preempting state law. In particular,
and in contrast to National League of Cities, the autonomy model
allows Congress to regulate the hours and wages of most state and
local employees.51 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, there-
fore, is unlikely to raise problems under the autonomy model of feder-
alism.52
50. See note 31 and accompanying text.
51. The autonomy model would protect state power to set wages and hours only for
employees directly related to the state's conduct of republican government. Congress, for
example, should not be able to dictate the wages and hours of state governors, legislators, or
judges. Compare Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460 (holding that the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act does not apply to state court judges, and stating "[t]hrough
the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority,
a State defines itself as a sovereign"). Congress itself appears to have recognized this principle,
because it has never attempted to control the wages or hours of these officials.
Regulation of wages and hours for police officers might also be reserved to the states under
the autonomy model. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 57 (cited in note 22). Congress,
however, has subjected police officers to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the courts have up-
held that application since New York. See note 52.
52. Lower courts hearing challenges to the Fair Labor Standards Act after New York have
uniformly rejected those challenges. See Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir. 1993); May v.
Arkansas Forestry Cornm'n, 993 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1993); Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Parr v. California, 811 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Ahern v. New York, 807 F.
Supp. 919 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). See also Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Corm'n, 826 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a federal statute
exempting a state-owned railroad from state taxation was consistent with New York's principles
of federalism because "Congress [was] in no sense commandeering state regulatory processes").
As described in note 51, the autonomy model might prohibit federal regulation of the wages
and hours of state police officers. At least two lower courts have upheld application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to police officers since New York v. United States, but without considering
the impact of New York or the potentially special status of police officers under that decision.
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Second, the autonomy model allows Congress to continue using
the tool of conditional preemption. Under this type of statute,
Congress allows the states to choose whether to participate in a regu-
latory scheme. If the states choose nonparticipation, Congress prom-
ises to assume the regulatory burden. This type of choice preserves
state autonomy; the states remain independent decision makers re-
sponsible to their voters.5 3
Third, the autonomy model places no special constraints upon
Congress' Spending Clause power. As long as Congress abides by the
rules established in the Court's Spending Clause cases,54 the auton-
omy model allows Congress to tempt the states into following federal
directives. The size of the federal purse is daunting, but the states
retain the power to reject federal largesse. Once again, that power to
say "no" distinguishes an autonomous government, or independent
decision maker, from a captive field office in the federal bureaucracy.
55
Finally, the autonomy model recognizes that Congress has
special powers to enforce provisions of the federal Constitution de-
signed to achieve fair and democratic forms of government. Congress
can, for example, enforce the Fifteenth and Nineteenth amendments
(which bar discrimination in setting the franchise) even though the
power to define the electorate is a power normally associated with
independent governments. 56 In fact, the motor voter legislation dis-
cussed above might survive scrutiny under this rationale, although it
See Ahern v. New York, 807 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Marie v. New Orleans, 612 S.2d 244
(La. Ct. App. 1992).
53. Compare New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424; Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 59 (cited in note
22).
54. The Court has held that Congress exceeds its Spending Clause authority only when:
(1) it fails to state conditions clearly; (2) the conditions are not related "to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs," South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987)
(quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)); or (3) the inducement is "so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' Id. at 211 (quoting
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
55. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423; Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 46-50 (cited in note
22). But see generally Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85 (criticizing the effect of the Supreme Court's
Spending Clause doctrine on state sovereignty).
56. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 38-40. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 468
(noting that "the principles of federalism that constrain Congress' exercise of its Commerce
Clause powers are attenuated when Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil
War Amendments"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 & n.18 (1983); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
The Fifteenth Amendment bars racial discrimination in setting the franchise, while the
Nineteenth Amendment extends the vote to women.
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would be a much closer case than some other congressional attempts
to enforce these amendments.
57
The autonomy model poses only one threat to congressional
regulatory power: Under this model, Congress cannot directly com-
mand state governments to implement federal programs or to adopt
particular laws. Some commentators have argued that it is inefficient
and costly to force Congress to build new national agencies designed
to implement important programs.5 These commentators would
prefer to give Congress the power to commandeer state agencies to
enforce those programs. Congress itself occasionally has succumbed
to that temptation.
In 1990, for example, Congress directed several states to adopt
regulations preventing the export of unprocessed timber from public
lands.59 Congress may have had several motives in directing the
states to perform this regulation: It may have wanted to save the
time of federal regulators, it may have wanted to shift responsibility
for potentially unpopular provisions to the states, or it may even have
wanted to give the states a role in regulating conduct they historically
had controlled. The effect, however, was to force the states (with no
opportunity to refuse) to regulate the conduct of third parties, includ-
ing timber purchases between wholly private companies.60
New York v. United States forbids such direct commands to the
states, and the autonomy model supports that result. As long as the
57. The Senate Report on motor voter registration explicitly invoked Congress' power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as support for the legislation. Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, National Voter Registration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1993). Similarly, the House Report described motor voter registration as a response to
restrictive and discriminatory registration techniques. H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-5 (1993). These reports, however, do not provide a particularly strong factual basis for
linking motor voter registration to the conquest of discriminatory voting practices.
58. See, for example, James E. Pfander, A Comparative Assessment of Environmental
Regulation Through the Agency of Member States in Europe and the United States, in Thomas
Ulen, John Braden and Henk Folmer, eds., Environmental Federalism: The European Union
and the United States (Elgar, 1994); Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 2005-06 (cited in note 29).
59. Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3)
(Supp. 1994).
60. In order to achieve the Act's purpose of"effect[ing] a net increase in domestic process-
ing of timber harvested from public lands," 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3)(A), states had to do more than
simply prohibit the direct export of timber harvested from public lands; they also had to
regulate the substitution of timber harvested from private lands for timber grown on public
lands. See id. at § 620b(a)-(b) (prohibiting direct or indirect substitution of timber harvested
from private lands for timber harvested from federal land); id. at § 620c(d)(3)(B) (applying direct
and indirect substitution rules to timber harvested from state-owned lands). Regulating
indirect substitution of timber requires regulation of transactions between two or more private
parties. Id. at § 620b(b).
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autonomy model prevails, the national government will not be able
simply to command state governments to administer national pro-
grams. In Board of Natural Resources v. Brown,6 1 the Ninth Circuit
properly struck this provision of the Forest Resources Conservation
Act under the autonomy model.
62
Similarly, two district courts recently struck a provision of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that requires local law en-
forcement officers to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5
business days" whether the potential purchaser of a handgun is le-
gally entitled to possess such a gun.63 Once again, this provision vio-
lates the autonomy principle articulated in New York v. United States.
Despite its laudable goals, the Brady Act "commandeers" local law
61. 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 946-47. Several lower courts reached a similar conclusion in cases challenging
environmental regulations promulgated during the 1970s. The regulations struck in those cases
required states to establish automobile inspection programs and to administer other portions of
a federal environmental program. See Maryland u. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per
curiam); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for
consideration of mootness sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam); Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, EPA v.
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curian). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all three
cases, but remanded for consideration of mootness when the Environmental Protection Agency
rescinded some of the regulations and conceded that the rest were "invalid unless modified in
certain respects." EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. at 103 & n.3. Long before New York v. United States,
therefore, some lower courts sensed that "commandeer[ing] the regulatory powers of the states,
along with their personnel and resources," would violate the Constitution. Train, 521 F.2d at
992.
More recently, three lower courts have reached varying conclusions about whether the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act impermissibly forces states to negotiate gaming compacts with
Indian tribes. Compare Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (holding
that the Act violates the Tenth Amendment by compelling states to negotiate compacts) and
Pueblo of Sandia v. New Mexico, No. CIV 92-0613 JC, 1992 WL 540817 (D.N.M. Nov. 13, 1992)
with Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment because states may choose to avoid negotiation; in
that event, a mediator imposes the tribe's proposed compact if it accords with federal law). See
also Jerome L. Wilson, State Should Challenge Indian Casino Law, N.Y. L. J. 2 (July 15, 1994)
(arguing that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act violates the Tenth Amendment as interpreted
in New York).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (Supp. 1994). This determination must include "research in
whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system desig-
nated by the Attorney General." Id. The two decisions holding this provision unconstitutional
are Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994), and Mack v. United States, 856
F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994). See also Jerome L. Wilson, State Sovereignty Case Shoots at
Brady Law, Nat'l L. J. A21 (July 11, 1994) (praising the Printz decision). A third district court
has upheld the provision against a Tenth Amendment challenge. See Koog v. United States, 852
F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
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enforcement officers to "enforce a federal regulatory program." In
doing so, the Act both absorbs government resources that the states
might direct elsewhere and confuses the lines of political accountabil-
ity.66 This provision of the Brady Act, like the offending provision of
the Forest Resources Conservation Act, unconstitutionally intrudes
upon state autonomy.
Recognizing these flaws in the Brady Act, the Forest Resources
Conservation Act, and other federal statutes would not hamper
Congress's ability to achieve important national goals. The autonomy
model allows Congress ample room to achieve those objectives
through federal grants or conditional preemption.66 That is the path
Congress chooses for most regulatory programs. Indeed, when the
Ninth Circuit struck down the timber provision in Brown, Congress
promptly remedied the situation by adopting a new version of the Act
that relies upon conditional preemption.67 Similarly, Congress could
remedy the defect in the Brady Act by offering federal funds in ex-
change for enforcement of the Act, establishing a scheme of condi-
tional preemption, or assigning the Act's duties to federal officers.
68
Commanding state governments to administer federal pro-
grams is a short-sighted strategy. It is true that state governments
64. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 290, 288 (1981)
(quoted with approval in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2420). The federal
government has attempted to distinguish the Brady Act from the provision struck in New York
by arguing that the Brady Act merely requires states to administer a federal program, rather
than to enact that program into state law. See, for example, Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513. As
one court has pointed out, however, the provision condemned by New York required states
either to enact legislation or to take title to radioactive wastes. The latter option-as
unconstitutional in the Supreme Court's eyes as the former choice-required administrative
rather than legislative enactment. Id. Federal attempts to command state administrative
energies, moreover, threaten state autonomy in the same manner as attempts to compel state
legislative enactments. In both cases, the federal intrusion interferes with the ability of state
citizens to control their governmental representatives.
65. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15. The Brady Act raises at least three accountability
issues: (1) the lack of federal funds to support the Act's mandates may force local law
enforcement agencies to cut other essential services, leading voters to blame local officials for
those cuts; (2) voters opposed to gun control may identify the Act with the local officials charged
with administering it, and blame those officials for the statute's enactment; and (3) citizens may
blame law enforcement officers for erroneous applications of the Act. Although the Act
specifically exempts local officers from civil liability for erroneous determinations, 18 U.S.C. §
922(s)(7), it does not shield them from popular criticism or electoral retaliation for those
decisions. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15.
66. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423-24; Merritt, 88 Colum L. Rev. at 68-69 (cited in note
22).
67. Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Amendments Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-45, 107 Stat. 223 (July 1, 1993) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§.620-620j).
68. See Wilson, Natl L. J. at A21 (cited in note 63).
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sometimes appear to offer a quick, inexpensive means of
implementing an urgent program. As a nation facing ever-changing
and ever more challenging social ills, however, we are better off pre-
serving the checking power and innovative energies of state govern-
ments than sacrificing those resources to balance today's budget. As
autonomous decision makers, state governments will help us devise
lasting solutions to the problems of both today and tomorrow. To put
it bluntly, we need long-term sources of regulatory creativity more
than we need short-term efficiency.
C. Constitutional Anchors for the Autonomy Model
I have saved the most important question for last: Even if the
autonomy model promotes important values, and imposes no substan-
tial costs on the central government, does the model derive from the
constitutional text? Without a constitutional anchor, the Supreme
Court lacks power to strike down any federal statute, no matter how
well crafted the Court's political theory. Can we, then, tie the auton-
omy model to the Constitution?
In New York, the Supreme Court rooted its autonomy theory in
a symbiotic reading of the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment.
The Court recognized that the Tenth Amendment contains no lan-
guage that could be read as an affirmative limit on the powers con-
ferred by Article I of the Constitution.s9 At the same time, the Court
suggested that the existence of the Tenth Amendment implies inher-
ent limits in the powers conferred by that article.70 The Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause together, in other words, achieved
what the Tenth Amendment alone could not.71
69. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417-18.
70. See id. at 2417 (stating "if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred upon Congress
[in the Commerce Clause or elsewhere]"); id. at 2418 (noting "the Tenth Amendment confirms
that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine ... whether
an incident of sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power"); id. at 2423
(stating "[t~he allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause... authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state govern-
ments' regulation of interstate commerce").
71. At some points, the Court appeared to rely upon the combined force of these two
constitutional provisions, but at others it appeared simply unwilling to choose between them.
See, for example, id. (noting "[iun the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes
no difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the
limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirative provisions of the
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In this way, the New York Court seemed to use the Tenth
Amendment as a rule of construction for interpreting the Commerce
Clause: Because the Tenth Amendment affirms the reservation of
unenumerated powers to the states or people, the Court must exercise
caution in construing the scope of Article I powers. In particular,
although the Commerce Clause empowers Congress "to regulate in-
terstate commerce," it does not allow Congress "to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."72
This reading of the constitutional text, however, is confusing.
In particular, it is likely to confuse lower courts into thinking the
Court has revived the territorial model of federalism. A lower court
reading the Supreme Court's language in New York might conclude
that it should interpret the Commerce Clause conservatively, not only
with respect to Congress' methods of regulating interstate commerce,
but with respect to the subjects of its regulation.
Indeed, one lower court already has made this mistake. In
United States v. Lopez, 73 the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction under
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal statute that bars the
knowing possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a
primary or secondary school7 4 Relying upon New York, and stressing
that "the management of education, and the general control of simple
firearms possession by ordinary citizens, have traditionally been a
state responsibility,"7 5 the court ruled that Congress had not shown a
sufficient nexus between interstate commerce and this crime.76
Lopez demonstrates the danger that lower courts will read
New York's juxtaposition of the Tenth Amendment and Commerce
Clause as a license to curtail the fields of private conduct open to
Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
Amendment"); id. at 2429 (stating: "[wlhether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our
Government established by the Constitution").
72. Id. at 2423.
73. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-
1260).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 1994).
75. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364.
76. In particular, the court faulted Congress for failing to make any findings about the
impact on interstate commerce of either primary and secondary education generally or gun
possession near schools specifically. Id. at 1366-67. The court expressly reserved the question
whether a statute like the Gun-Free School Zones Act might be valid if premised on sufficient
congressional findings of a nexus to interstate commerce. Id. at 1368.
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federal regulation.77 To avoid this problem, the autonomy model de-
mands a constitutional base that embodies more precisely its concerns
with the processes of state government.
As I have argued elsewhere, the guarantee of republican gov-
ernment contained in Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution offers
that groundwork.78 If the national government pledges to maintain a
republican form of government in each state, as it does in the
Guarantee Clause, then a fortiori the national government must
promise to maintain governments within those states. A republican
government, moreover, is accountable to its electorate: It is not re-
sponsible to divine power, an inherited monarchy, or even the na-
tional government. Through the Guarantee Clause, therefore, the
national government pledges to maintain autonomous governments in
each state-governments that are responsible to the people of that
state rather than to the national government.
I have described elsewhere the historical support for this in-
terpretation of the Guarantee Clause and the reasons why this inter-
pretation should be held justiciable.79 The language of the Guarantee
Clause not only supports the result in New York; it requires that re-
sult. In future cases, the Guarantee Clause would tie the courts more
securely to the autonomy model by focusing their attention on the
features of republican government-especially the right of state vot-
ers to set their own legislative agendas and choose tasks for their own
government administrators.80
77. See also United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding,
without citation to New York, that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact a federal caijacking statute), overruled by United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106 (6th Cir.
1994).
Many lower courts, of course, have properly recognized the Supreme Court's focus on the
autonomy of state governmental processes in New York. See, for example, Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 826 F. Supp. at 1519
(acknowledging that "New York stands for a much more limited proposition: that when
Congress desires to regulate, it must do so directly and cannot enlist the States to do its
bidding).
78. The Guarantee Clause promises that "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 4. I finst devel-
oped this theory in Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 22). See also Deborah J. Merritt,
Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U.
Colo. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 1994).
79. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 29-36, 70-78. See also Merritt, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev.
80. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court observed that the "distinguishing fea-
ture" of the republican form of government preserved by the Guarantee Clause is "the right of
the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own
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In New York, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility
that the Guarantee Clause might limit federal power to regulate the
states.81 Unfortunately, the Court refused to rest its holding on the
Guarantee Clause, preferring its combined reading of the Tenth
Amendment and Commerce Clause.
In Lopez, which the Court has just agreed to review, the Court
has an opportunity to embrace the Guarantee Clause and thus correct
the misunderstanding generated by New York's focus on the Tenth
Amendment. Adoption of the Guarantee Clause in Lopez would both
reverse the result in that case (because federal regulation of gun
possession does not threaten republican government) and provide a
more secure foundation for the Court's autonomy model of federalism.
That model constitutes the most promising attempt to fashion a judi-
cially enforceable federalism principle.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that autonomous state governments are political
assets that require judicial protection against national intrusion, that
the Supreme Court's autonomy model offers the best possibility of
providing that protection, and that the autonomy model is best rooted
in the text of the Guarantee Clause rather than in the shadows of the
Tenth Amendment and Article I. The autonomy model of federalism
promises the best of two constitutional worlds. It promotes a strong
national government free to regulate any field of private endeavor,
while also preserving healthy state governments to regulate the fields
Congress avoids, opening political doors to new faces, promoting
diverse living conditions, and spawning innovative programs. This
laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies." Duncan v. McCall, 139
U.S. 449, 461 (1891). See also Federalist No. 39 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers (Mentor, 1961) (stating that "we may define a republic to be... a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behavior. It is essential to such a Government, that it be derived from the great body of
the society").
81. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432-33. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 463 (noting
that both the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause secure "the authority of a state's
people to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials"); Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973) (recognizing "a State's constitutional responsibility for the
establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an
appropriately designated class of public office holders," and citing the Guarantee Clause as
support for this proposition).
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update of an eighteenth century vision is the best formula for the
future of federalism.

